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powers under the state's probate law than most fiduciaries
would hold.20
FOOTNOTES
1 Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F.
Supp. 360 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
2 E.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990) (absolute liability imposed on secured
creditor).
3 City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 816 F. Supp.
564 (D. Ariz. 1993) (trustee); Castlerock Estates, Inc. v.
Estate of Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Calif. 1994)
(conservator and executor).
4 Id.
5 871 F. Supp. 360, 362 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
6 Id. at 361.
7 42 U.S.C. § 9607 et seq.
8 871 F. Supp. 360, 363 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 367.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 368.
15 Id. at 369.
16 816 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ariz. 1993).
17 Id. at 568.
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607.
19 See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto, 858
F. 2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989).
20 Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F.
Supp. 360, 367 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
DISABILITY BENEFITS. The debtor was involved in
an automobile accident and received benefits from an
accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy for
the loss of an eye. The payment was received pre-petition
and deposited in the debtor's bank account. The debtor
claimed the proceeds as an exempt disability payment under
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C). The court held that the proceeds
were not eligible for the exemption because the exemption
was limited to the debtor's right to receive a disability
benefit and the debtor no longer had a right to receive the
benefit since the benefit was already paid. In re Chapman,
177 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
INVOLUNTARY PETITION. Under a divorce
judgment, the debtor was required to pay the former spouse
$500 per week in alimony and $500 per week as child
support for the couple's three minor children. The former
spouse filed an involuntary petition against the debtor on
the former spouse's behalf and on behalf of the three
children. The debtor argued that the petition was
insufficient in that at least three creditors did not sign the
petition. The court held that the three children each
qualified as a claimant sufficient to support the filing of an
involuntary petition. In re Hopkins, 177 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1995).
SUBORDINATION. The debtor was a closely-held
corporation which operated several egg and chick
production facilities. When the debtor began experiencing
financial difficulties, several shareholders who were also
officers made loans or advances to the debtor. Only two of
the loans were documented on the corporation's books and
officially approved by the directors. The shareholders filed
unsecured claims for the amounts loaned to the debtor.
Another unsecured creditor objected to the claims and
sought denial of the claims or at least subordination of the
claims to the other unsecured claims. The creditor alleged
that the loans were inequitable conduct in that the loans
were made when the debtor was undercapitalized and
allowed the debtor to favor some creditors while harming
other creditors who continued to provide credit. The court
held that the creditor failed to demonstrate that the debtor
was undercapitalized when the advances were made or that
the advances were other than bona fide attempts to keep the
debtor in business. Absent any showing of inequitable
conduct, the court held that the claims of the shareholders
could not be subordinated to other unsecured creditors. In
re Colonial Poultry Farms, 177 B.R. 291 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
TRUSTEE FEES.  The Chapter 12 debtor's plan
provided for direct payments of all secured claims, real
estate tax claims and attorney's fees.  Because unsecured
creditors would receive payments only if the debtor had
disposable income, the trustee would not receive any fee
unless disposable income was earned by the debtor.  The
court held that the secured claims could be paid directly to
the creditors without the trustee fee but that the real estate
taxes and attorney's fees were to be paid through the trustee.
The court left open the question of whether the trustee
would receive adequate compensation under the plan and
allowed the trustee to petition for additional fees.  In re
Beard, 45 F.3d 113 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 177 B.R. 74
(S.D. Ohio 1993), aff'g, 134 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1991). Note: An article by Dr. Harl is scheduled to appear
in the May 5, 1995 Agricultural Law Digest on payment of
trustee's fees in Chapter 12 bankruptcy.
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtors had filed a Chapter 11 case
which was closed in November 1989. The IRS had filed a
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claim for 1986 and 1987 taxes and had not objected to the
plan or closing of the case. In 1991, the IRS audited the
debtors’ 1986 return and assessed the debtors for additional
taxes for 1986 and 1987 with penalties.  The debtors sought
a declaratory judgment that the IRS assessments were
precluded by the final judgment in the bankruptcy case. The
IRS argued that the assessments were new claims. The
District Court held that the assessments were sufficiently
connected to the bankruptcy claims to be precluded by the
final bankruptcy judgment. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the IRS was not barred by res judicata because
the taxes were nondischargeable whether or not the IRS
filed a claim in the case. In re DePaolo, 45 F.3d 373 (10th
Cir. 1995), rev'g, 165 B.R. 491 (D. Wyo. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor did not file income tax
returns for 1982, 1983, and 1984. The IRS made
assessments in 1988 for those years based on substitute
returns created by the IRS.  The debtor claimed to have
filed returns for those years in November 1989 when returns
for other delinquent years were filed. In January 1993, the
IRS filed notice of levy for the assessments of taxes for the
three years.  The court held that the substitute returns
created by the IRS did not qualify as returns filed by the
debtor for purposes of making the taxes dischargeable under
Section 523(a)(1)(B)(i). The court also held that the taxes
were also priority taxes under Section 507(a)(7)(A)(iii)
because if the debtor did file returns in 1989, the taxes were
assessable on the date of the petition (within three years
after filing of the returns) but had not been assessed as of
the date of the petition. Matter of Delaney, 177 B.R. 251
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1994).
The debtors failed to file income tax returns for four tax
years and the IRS sought to have the taxes declared
nondischargeable for willful attempt to evade payment of
the taxes. The court held that although mere failure to file
and pay taxes was not sufficient, the IRS had demonstrated
that the debtors had sufficient income to pay the taxes but
purchased an expensive home instead and that the debtors
had underreported their income when they did file the
returns; therefore, the taxes were nondischargeable for
willful attempt to evade taxes. Matter of Halburg, 177
B.R. 101 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
SETOFF. The debtors operated a reforestation business
which reforested land under contracts with the USDA. In
order to finance their operations, the debtors assigned these
contracts to a third party lender. The IRS filed a notice of
setoff with the USDA to setoff the amounts owed to the
debtors against tax deficiency claims filed by the IRS in the
debtors' bankruptcy case. The IRS also sought turnover of
amounts paid to the lender. The court held that the
assignments of the contracts were valid but that financing
statement filed by the lender as to the contracts were not
valid as against the IRS; therefore, the IRS could setoff
amounts due under the contracts even though the contracts
had been assigned and pledged as security. However, the
court also held that the IRS could not recover amounts
already paid to the assignee.  In re Medina, 177 B.R. 335
(Bankr. D. Or. 1994).
In 1990, the debtor claimed a net operating loss which
was carried back to previous tax years and the debtor filed
for a refund. The IRS paid the refund but miscalculated the
interest owed such that the refund paid was $45,000 more
than should have been paid. After the debtor filed for
bankruptcy in 1991, the debtor also had another net
operating loss which was also carried back and formed the
basis for another refund claim. The IRS discovered the first
error and setoff the overpayment against the new refund.
The court held that the setoff was allowable. In re Franklin
Savings Corp., 177 B.R. 356 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
TAX LIENS. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 in
October 1989 and had the case converted to Chapter 7 in
June 1990. The bankruptcy estate included a truck of which
the Chapter 7 trustee took possession in July 1990 and
eventually sold. The IRS filed a secured claim in February
1990 based on liens filed in 1988 and 1989. The trustee
sought to avoid the tax liens under Section 545(2) and
I.R.C. § 6323(b) as a bona fide purchaser.  The court held
that because the trustee had notice, upon the IRS filing of
the claim, of the IRS lien before obtaining possession of the
vehicle in July 1990, the trustee could not avoid the lien
under I.R.C. § 6323(b). In re Walter, 45 F.3d 1023 (6th
Cir. 1995), aff'g, 158 B.R. 984 (N.D. Ohio 1993), rev'g,
139 B.R. 695 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
CONTRACTS
MODIFICATION . The defendant entered into a
written contract to purchase 91,000 pounds of basil leaves
from the plaintiff over one year. The contract contained a
provision prohibiting oral modification of the contract. The
contract was modified several times, first to increase the per
pound charge because the defendant wanted more of the
stems removed before delivery and later to increase the per
pound charge to reflect the increase in imported basil leaves
prices. The defendant accepted several shipments at these
new prices over several months but failed to pay for the last
few shipments. The plaintiff sued for payment of the last
deliveries and for breach of contract for the defendant's
failure to purchase a total of 91,000 pounds. The defendant
argued that the plaintiff breached the contract in orally
modifying the contract. The court raised the issue of
whether the oral modifications violated the statute of frauds
but held that the acceptance of shipments and payments for
them by the defendant waived any objection to the statutory
or contractual provisions requiring all modification to be in
writing. Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo's, Inc., 873 F.
Supp. 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
GRAIN STANDARDS. The Grain Inspection, Packers
and Stockyards Admin. (GIPSA) has issued proposed
regulations amending the grain standards for barley to
include two classes, malting barley and barley; to remove
the U.S. Choice grade for two-row malting barley; and to
revise several grading procedures and inspection standards.
60 Fed. Reg. 15075 (March 22, 1995).
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ORGANIC PRODUCTS. The AMS is seeking
applications for approved synthetic and prohibited natural
substances to be considered on a national list to be included
in the standards for organic production and handling. 60
Fed. Reg. 15744 (March 27, 1995).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* In 1986, the debtor, a perishable
agricultural commodities dealer subject to PACA,
purchased several interests in a marketing terminal
cooperative which entitled the debtor to lease shops in the
terminal market. In 1989 and 1991, the debtor purchased
perishable agricultural commodities from several sellers
who were not paid for the produce. The sellers filed notices
of intent to claim part of the PACA trust before the debtor
filed for bankruptcy. The sellers sought to include in the
PACA trust, the proceeds from the bankruptcy trustee's sale
of the terminal shops' interests held by the debtor. The
sellers argued that the rent paid for the shops was derived
from the sale of the produce purchased from the sellers. The
court held that the interests themselves could not be subject
to the PACA trust because the interests were purchased
before the commodities were purchased from the sellers. In
addition, the rent payments were not included in the PACA
trust because the payments were bona fide and made in the
normal course of business. In re Kornblum & Co., Inc.,
177 B.R. 187 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
The defendant was a secured creditor of a produce
merchant subject to the Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act (PACA). The plaintiff had sold perishable
produce to the merchant for which the merchant had not
paid. During the time the produce was purchased and
several months later, the defendant had received payments
on the merchant's loans and the plaintiff sought to recover
these payments as subject to the PACA trust. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that
the merchant was not paying for produce on a timely
manner as early as July 1993 and certainly by October
1993. However, the defendant argued that it had diligently
sought to discover the merchant's financial status but was
not given complete information and was assured by the
merchant that all PACA claims would be paid. The court
held that although the defendant had some knowledge of the
merchant's financial troubles, the defendant's diligence in its
unsuccessful attempts to investigate the merchant's financial
status established that the defendant was a bona fide
purchaser for value and that the loan payments were not
subject to the PACA trust. Battle v. Fresh Preps
Distribution, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
SEEDS-ALM § 10.02.* The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations to include in the definition of noxious weed
seeds under the Federal Seed Act (FSA) all weeds listed in
the Federal Noxious Weed Act (FNWA). The proposed
regulations are designed to overcome the prohibition of
application of the FNWA to imported shipments of seeds
subject to the FSA regulations. The problem was most
recently adjudicated in Pennington Seed, Inc. v. U.S., 10
F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (destruction of imported grass seed
containing serrated tussock seed improper because grass
seed governed by FSA which did not list serrated tussock
seed as noxious weed). 60 Fed. Reg. 15257 (March 23,
1995).
WEEDS. The APHIS has issued proposed amendments
to the noxious weed regulations to remove Stratiotes
aloides Linnaeus (water aloe) and Euphorbia prunifolia
Jacquin (painted euphobia) from the list of noxious weeds
and to add Ottelia alismoides (L.) Pers and Solanum viarum
Dunal (tropical soda apple) to the list. 60 Fed. Reg. 15260
(March 23, 1995).
WETLAND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS. The
FmHA had obtained ranch land which included wetlands
through foreclosure and decided to transfer the land to the
priority secured lender (a bank) in exchange for relief from
the debt. The bank sold the land to third parties who used
the ranch land for grazing. The plaintiff brought suit against
the FmHA, the bank and the buyers, alleging that the
transfer of the land by the FmHA without retaining a
conservation easement for the wetlands violated 7 U.S.C. §
1985(g). The FmHA argued that the statute did not apply
because the land was abandoned to the creditor. The court
held that the statute did apply because the transfer was in
effect a sale in that the FmHA received consideration for
the transfer from the relief from the debt. The court also
held that the statute applied even though the FmHA held
title subject to a debt, holding that the easement was
required even if the FmHA had to pay part of the debt for
the easement. The buyers argued that rescinding the sale to
the extent of imposing an easement was inequitable. The
court noted that the plaintiffs alleged that the buyers knew
about the wetlands issue and removed a notice about the
issue from the contract, thus indicating that the buyers had
notice that an easement could be imposed; therefore, the
action was not barred as inequitable and rescission could be
allowed if the evidence demonstrated that the buyers did
have notice of the wetlands issue.  The court also held that,
although the buyers were not subject to the statute involved,
the buyers were proper parties to the action in order to
provide full relief and to protect the buyers' interests.
National Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir.
1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE . In 1951, the
decedent entered into a settlement agreement with the
decedent's spouse which provided for monthly support for
the spouse and for the couple's two children. The spouse
also received title to the marital home and the children
received a promise to be included in a trust to be established
in the decedent's will. The monthly payments were much
less than the amounts needed to support the lifestyle the
spouse had been accustomed to; however, the evidence was
inconclusive as to whether the decedent could have afforded
any higher payments. The decedent eventually divorced the
spouse and the settlement agreement became the property
settlement of the divorce order. The decedent's will failed to
establish the trust for the two children and the children filed
a claim against the estate. The estate settled with the
children and claimed the settlement amount as a deductible
claim against the estate. The IRS argued that the estate
failed to prove conclusively that the spouse had given any
consideration for the promise for the trust; therefore, the
claim  was not deductible. The court held that although the
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estate failed to value precisely the consideration given by
the spouse, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that
some value be given in that the monthly support payments
were less than the support provided before the agreement
and the decedent's estate at the time of the agreement was
substantially greater than the support payments. Estate of
Kosow v. Comm'r, 45 F.3d 1524 (11th Cir. 1995).
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* In order to increase
the marital deduction, the surviving spouse asked several
legatees of the decedent's will to disclaim their interests in
the devises. Although no specific promises were made, the
legatees testified that they understood that the surviving
spouse would recompense them for the disclaimers, and
indeed, these legatees did receive money or property equal
to or exceeding the value of the disclaimed interests a short
time after filing the disclaimers. The court held that the
marital deduction could not include the disclaimed property
because the disclaimers were not effective since the legatees
still received a benefit. Monroe v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. No.
16 (1995).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The taxpayer was the beneficiary of four
irrevocable trusts created before 1985. The remainder
beneficiaries were the taxpayer's two children and their
issue. One of the children had died. The taxpayer renounced
all interests in the trusts, causing the trusts to terminate and
all trust corpus to be distributed to the remaining child and
the children of the deceased child. The IRS ruled that the
taxpayer would be considered the transferor of the trusts'
corpus, the renunciation of the trust interests did not subject
the trusts to GSTT, and the children of the taxpayer's
deceased child were not skip persons. Ltr. Rul. 9510071,
Dec. 15, 1994.
In 1953, five irrevocable trusts were created for the
grantors' five children. The trusts provided for five trustees
and a minimum of three trustees in order to execute any
fiduciary duties. The beneficiaries sought amendment of the
trusts to provide for two trustees and consent of a minimum
of two trustees to execute fiduciary duties. The IRS ruled
that the changes would not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr.
Rul. 9511031, Dec. 16, 1994.
In 1962 an irrevocable trust was created by the
taxpayer's parent. The trust provided that the taxpayer was
the income beneficiary for life with the trust to be split on
the taxpayer's death into as many trusts as there were
children of the taxpayer. If a child predeceased the taxpayer,
a trust was to be formed for the surviving spouse or issue of
that child. The children's trusts were to terminate when each
beneficiary reached age 25, but the taxpayer had the right to
extend the period of the trusts to the lifetime of each
beneficiary. The children had the testamentary power to
appoint the trust to the child's children in trust. The taxpayer
exercised the power to extend the trusts to the lifetime of
each beneficiary. The IRS ruled that the extension of the
children's trusts did not subject the trusts to GSTT and that
the trusts would not be included in the children's gross
estates. The IRS cautioned, however, that the children's
exercise of the power to appoint the trusts to their children
in trust could cause extension of the trust beyond 21 years
after the death of a person living at the creation of the
original trust. Ltr. Rul. 9511039, Dec. 20, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The decedents, husband and wife,
and their child and grandchildren each owned farmland
which was contributed to a corporation. Each contributor
received stock in the corporation with the father receiving
62 percent of the stock. The executrix argued that the
transaction had no gift element because the contributions
were made in the ordinary course of business. The court
rejected that argument because the transactions were
between related parties, the circumstances indicated that the
transactions were made to increase the income of the child,
and the value of the stock received would not have been
acceptable to an unrelated contributor. The court held that
the value of the land contributed by the father exceeded the
value of the stock received by the father, even with the
stock value increased by 40 percent for the majority
interest. Estate of Trenchard v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1995-121.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].*   The
decedent and spouse had established an inter vivos
revocable trust with the decedent and spouse as
beneficiaries. The trust provided that each beneficiary had
the power to revoke or amend the trust. The trust also
provided that at the death of one beneficiary, the remaining
beneficiary was to receive all net annual income. However,
the trust provided that if a beneficiary became incapacitated,
trust income and principal were to be distributed only for
the beneficiary's health, support and maintenance. The trust
defined "incapacity" as being unable to manage one's
financial affairs. The IRS ruled that the incapacity provision
would normally cause the trust to not qualify as QTIP;
however, because the surviving spouse had the power to
amend or revoke the trust at any time, including during
incapacity, the surviving spouse's interest in the trust would
qualify for QTIP. Ltr. Rul. 9511002, Dec. 2, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[3].* The decedent had divorced from
the former spouse but no property settlement was formally
made in the court proceedings. Instead, the parties reached a
private agreement that the former spouse would receive a
life insurance policy on the decedent, a portion of the
proceeds from another life insurance policy and a portion of
the decedent’s retirement benefits from an employer. The
court held that the life insurance policy was included in the
decedent’s gross estate because it was transferred for no
consideration within three years of the decedent’s death.
The court also ruled that the portion of the proceeds of the
life insurance policy and retirement benefits paid to the
former spouse were also included in the gross estate
because the former spouse had no ownership of the policy
or retirement benefits before the decedent’s death. Est. of
Waters v. Comm’r,  95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,191
(4th Cir. 1995), aff'g on points, T.C. Memo. 1994-194.
The decedent had established a trust funded with stock
in a closely-held corporation. The decedent created a power
of attorney in a son which granted the son the power to
withdraw property from the trust and to make gifts. The son
withdrew 91 shares of stock from the trust and had the stock
transferred to the decedent. Then the stock was transferred
to the decedent's spouse. The IRS argued that the transfer
was a relinquishment of the decedent's power to revoke the
trust as to the transferred stock; therefore, the stock was
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included in the estate as a transfer within three years of
death. The court held that the form of the transfer was
substantial enough to have the transfers considered as a
withdrawal and gift since the son had specific authority to
withdraw trust corpus and to make gifts and the corporation
acknowledged the transfers by changing the names on the
stock for each transfer. Frank v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1995-132.
TRUSTS. In 1960, the decedent established a trust for
the benefit of the decedent with a remainder in trust to the
decedent's son and further remainders to the son's spouse
and children. The trust provided that after the death of the
grantor, any beneficiary or beneficiaries holding more than
two-thirds of the trust's beneficial interests could change
any trustee. The trust also provided that the son could
become a co-trustee. At the death of the grantor, the son
became a co-trustee and removed the bank trustee in favor
of another bank trustee. Several years later, the son resigned
as co-trustee and appointed the son's adult child as co-
trustee. The trust provided that the trustees could distribute
corpus for the beneficiary's "maintenance, support and
welfare." The IRS ruled that "welfare" was not a requisite
ascertainable standard; therefore, the son, as co-trustee, had
a general power of appointment over the trust corpus. The
IRS ruled that the son's resignation as co-trustee did not
cause a gift from the lapse of the general power of
appointment because the son still had the power to
reappoint himself as co-trustee. The IRS also ruled that the
resignation did not cause the trust corpus to be included in
the son's gross estate or subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9510065, Dec. 14, 1994.
  VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3][a].* Prior to reorganization
the corporation operated four businesses as divisions of the
corporation and two businesses as subsidiaries of the
corporation. All of the corporation stock was owned by
members of one family with both common and preferred
stock issued and owned by all shareholders. The corporation
reorganized three of the divisions as subsidiaries under tax-
free incorporations. The corporation then formed a holding
company to which all stock in all of the corporations was
transferred in a tax-free reorganization. The shareholders
received identical stock holdings in the holding corporation
as were held in the original corporation. The IRS ruled that
the reorganization did not subject the stock to valuation
under I.R.C. § 2701. Ltr. Rul. 9511028, Dec. 26, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer was a cash
basis nursery which sold citrus trees. The taxpayer collected
advance payments in one tax year on orders to be delivered
in the following tax year. Although the taxpayer had a
policy of refunding the advance payments if the orders were
cancelled before delivery, the court held that the advance
payments were income in the year received. Michaelis
Nursery, Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-143.
C CORPORATIONS
STOCK BASIS. The taxpayers, as husband and wife in
a community property state, owned shares of stock. As part
of a divorce settlement, the husband borrowed $2 million,
using the stock as collateral, and paid the wife $1.7 million
when the divorce became final. The wife did not report the
payment as income. The husband later sold the stock and
reported the gain based on an increase in basis in the stock
by the $1.7 million. The wife and IRS argued that the loan
was a community property debt; therefore, the payment was
a property division not a sale. The husband argued that the
loan was his obligation solely and that the payment was a
sale of the stock, allowing an increase in the stock basis.
The court held that because the loan was made before the
divorce decree was entered, the stock was still community
property and the community was liable for any default on
the loan; therefore, the loan was a community debt and the
$1.7 million payment represented a property division which
was not taxable to the wife and which did not increase the
husband's basis in the stock. Gaughan v. Comm'r, 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,161 (5th Cir. 1995), rev'g, T.C.
Memo. 1993-320.
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT. The taxpayers owned a
closely-held corporation and rented commercial real estate
to the corporation. The court held that the taxpayers
received constructive income in the months the corporation
did not pay rent for the property. Hooper v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-108.
COOPERATIVES. The IRS has determined that dues
received by tax-exempt agricultural organizations from
associate members with less than full voting rights are not
unrelated business income if the associate member category
was created with the intent to further the organization's
exempt purposes. Rev. Proc. 95-21, I.R.B. 1995-15.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* In 1983, the
taxpayers purchased farm and ranch land which contained
about 250,000 trees and schrubs which did not produce fruit
or nuts and were not harvested for wood. The trees and
shrubs were used primarily for a windbreak. The taxpayers
assigned a $1 per plant value and claimed depreciation and
investment tax credit on the trees and shrubs. The IRS
denied the depreciation and investment tax credit. The court
held that the trees and shrubs were not eligible for
depreciation or investment tax credit because the trees and
shrubs were not used for the production of fruit, nuts or
wood; therefore, the trees and shrubs were part of the
nondepreciable realty. Everson v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,150 (D. Mont. 1995).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* A corporation was owned by a husband and wife.
The corporation transferred preferred stock to two
charitable organizations. The corporation later redeemed the
stock from the charities in exchange for promissory notes.
The corporation suffered financial difficulties but was not in
bankruptcy nor was it insolvent when the corporation
renegotiated the notes to waive unpaid interest, reduce the
unpaid principal and to provide for early prepayment
of the remaining principal. The IRS ruled that the
renegotiation qualified as a purchase price adjustment under
I.R.C. § 108(e)(5), the purchase price adjustment amount
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was not included in regular or alternative minimum tax
income, the corporation's tax attributes were not reduced by
the purchase price adjustment, and the corporation's
earnings and profits were required to be increased by the
amount of the purchase price adjustment. Ltr. Rul.
9511045, Dec. 21, 1994.
EMPLOYMENT TAXES . The IRS has issued
guidance, in question and answer form, for application of
the new "Nanny tax" law, Pub. L. No. 103-387. The notice
modifies Rev. Proc. 70-6, 1970-1 C.B. 420 and Rev. Proc.
80-4, 1980-1 C.B. 581. Notice 95-18, I.R.B. 1995-18.
EXPENSE METHOD DEPRECIATION-ALM §
4.03[4][j].* The taxpayers were not allowed an expense
method deduction for medical equipment used in the
taxpayers' business because a proper election was not made.
The taxpayer were allowed only regular depreciation on the
equipment. Steinberg v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-116.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period April 1, 1995 through June 30, 1995, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments is 9 percent and for
underpayments is 10 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations also remains at 12
percent. Note: the just-enacted GATT legislation reduces
the interest rate on overpayments above $10,000 by 1.5
percentage points. Rev. Rul. 95-33, I.R.B 1995-15.
IRA. The IRS has cautioned that it does not officially
"approve" IRA investment vehicles other than through letter
rulings and cautioned taxpayers against investing in
investments advertised as "IRS approved" or "IRA
approved" investments without further investigation of the
qualifications of the investment.  IR-95-26.
LOSSES-ALM § 4.05.*  The taxpayer converted a
personal residence into a residential rental property. The
taxpayer demonstrated that the fair market value of the
property on the date of the conversion was less than the
taxpayer's basis in the property; therefore, the basis of the
property was the FMV on the date of conversion. The court
held that the taxpayer had a deductible loss on the sale of
the property for less than the new basis. Adams v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-142.
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The taxpayers had
regular net operating losses (NOLs) and alternative
minimum tax (AMT) net operating losses in 1985. The
taxpayers' return elected to carry forward only the regular
net operating losses and the taxpayers carried the AMT
NOLs back to previous tax years. The court held that under
the legislative history of I.R.C. § 172(b)(3)(C) and Rev.
Rul. 87-44, 1987-1 C.B. 3, the regular and AMT NOLs
must be carried together either back or forward. Miller v.
Comm'r, 104 T.C. No. 14 (1995).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
DEFINITION. The IRS has announced a proposal to
amend the partnership and corporation definition
regulations to allow unincorporated business organizations
to elect to be taxed as a partnership or corporation, so long
as the entity is not defined, for tax purposes, under a
specific code section. Notice 95-14, I.R.B. 1995-14.
DISTRIBUTIONS. In exchange for management
services as a general partner, the taxpayer received a one
percent interest in the partnership. The court held that the
value of the one percent interest was income to the taxpayer
because most of the services were performed before the
interest was transferred. Johnston v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1995-140.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayers
formed a limited liability company under the Texas Limited
Liability Act. The Act provides that an LLC is dissolved
upon the death, expulsion, withdrawal, bankruptcy or
dissolution of a member or other terminating event, unless
there is at least one remaining member and a number of the
remaining members, as established by the LLC agreement,
vote to continue the LLC. The Act also prohibited the
assignment or transfer of an LLC interest unless allowed by
the LLC agreement. The IRS ruled that the LLC would be a
partnership under the I.R.C. Ltr. Rul. 9510037, Dec. 9,
1994.
The taxpayers converted a limited partnership into a
limited liability company (LLC). The IRS ruled that the
LLC would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC
lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity of life since
the state LLC law and the LLC agreement required the
consent of all members to continue the partnership after a
terminating event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate
characteristic of transferability of interests because the Act
and agreement provided that if any other member objected
to the sale or assignment of a member’s interest in the LLC,
the transferee or assignee had no right to participate in the
management of the LLC. The IRS also ruled that no gain
was recognized from the conversion of the limited
partnership to the LLC. Ltr. Rul. 9511033, Dec. 19, 1994.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued guidance, in the
form of questions and answers, on the minimum funding
requirements of I.R.C. § 412(m) for plan years after
December 8, 1994. Rev. Rul. 95-31, I.R.B. 1995-15.
For plans beginning in March 1995, the weighted
average is 7.30 percent with the permissible range of 6.57 to
7.96 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable range) and 6.57
to 8.03 percent (90 to 110  percent permissable range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-11, I.R.B. 1995-13, 8.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT-ALM § 4.06.*  The President
has signed H.R. 831 which reinstates the deduction (an
above-the-line adjustment to income) for 25 percent of the
health insurance costs for self-employed individuals for
1994. The deduction is increased to 30 percent after 1994.
The taxpayer was an attorney and failed to report and
pay self-employment tax on self-employment income. The
taxpayer argued that an instruction on Form 1040 for self-
employment taxes on "wages" was misleading. The court
held that reliance on the form instructions, even if they were
ambiguous or misleading, was not justified in light of the
clear statutory requirement. Graham v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-114.
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FERTILIZER LIEN . In 1992, the debtor had
purchased fertilizer and other chemicals for use on 1992
crops. The supplier filed a statutory fertilizer and
agricultural lien in August 1992 which expired in July
1993. In July 1993, the debtor had crops growing on the
same land on which the fertilizer and other chemicals were
applied in 1992. The creditor claimed that the lien included
the crops growing in 1993. The debtor argued that the lien
extended only to crops harvested within one year after the
filing of the lien; therefore, the lien did not include crops
still growing when the lien expired. The court held that the
lien included all crops "produced" on the land within one
year of the lien filing and that the term "produced" had to
include growing crops because any other interpretation
would make the one year limitation superfluous. Matter of
Schlote, 177 B.R. 315 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
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